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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and 
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
No. 860340 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
Respondents attempt, in Sections III through VI of their 
Arguments, to have this Court decide this case upon issues not 
ruled on by the trial court or brought before the trial court and 
not appealed here by Appellant nor cross appealed by Respondents. 
Respondents raise issues on appeal not ruled on by the trial court 
regarding whether the lien notices complied with the relevant 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, whether the lien was untimely 
filed, and whether the releases of the lien were valid. Finally, 
Respondents raise the issue for the first time on appeal that they 
are entitled to attorneys fees. 
As authority for such a position, Respondents rely on Global 
Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 
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(Utah 1980). However, such reliance is in error since this case 
does not meet the requirements stated in that case to justify 
such a decision by this Court. Global states a four-part test, 
to determine whether this Court is to decide cases upon grounds 
other than those relied upon the trial court. The four 
requirements are 1) the issues must have been presented to the 
trial court, 2) the issues must have been briefed by the parties 
on appeal, 3) the issues must have been argued by both parties 
on appeal, and 4) a resolution of the issues must not require 
that there be determinations of fact which were not made by the 
trial court. 
The only element of this four-part test which is met in this 
case is that the issues Respondents present in Sections III 
through V of their brief were presented to the trial court in 
memoranda submitted to the trial in support or in opposition to 
the motions for summary judgment. The trial court made no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to these 
issues. The trial court did not base its decision upon these 
issues. And neither the Appellant nor the Respondents have 
appealed based upon those issues. Furthermore, Appellant has not 
briefed these issues. Therefore, to the extent that Respondents' 
Brief addresses issues not addressed nor ruled upon by the trial 
court, nor appealed by any parties to this appeal, Appellant will 
not burden this Court by replying to those issues. 
As to Section VI of Respondents' Brief, Appellant notes that 
the issue of attorneys fees has never been presented to the trial 
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court and thus, this Court is precluded from considering the 
issue. 
I. ISSUES SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF WERE INCLUDED 
IN THE PLEADINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND AS SUCH ARE 
PROPER ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT. 
R e s p o 1111 «i • 111 " i " i ' 111 Hi« ill I 11 ft t i I H I -3 b u c s s e t I .»r t 11 i n 
Appellant*s brief regarding whether the failure of the notary on 
Appellant's Notices J Men t set forth the expiration date of 
county of the notary's 
residence invalidated said Notices under the relevant statues are 
not properly before this Court is without merit. 
i I the uulfcSttl, il hp stated that the issue regarding the 
jurat was set forth in th*- pleadings i i was in fact <•- r i^ is for 
the lower courtf s decisic * •* • .mmary 
Judgment. Judge Judith Billings in her Memorandum Decision, at 
page 6, stated that "This Court finds that the failure to set 
forth thp roqui i: ed .i nfurmai i on regai. rii. nq I Iif notary's place of 
residence and the date upon which the notary's commission expires 
renders the notarization ineffective under Section 4f»-l -H, utili 
»IM1O '"uiiii (14S3) " Obviously I he issue was properly raised at 
the lower court level and as such, the issue is properly before 
this Court, 
I i J i I h t-f i the arguments in support of Appellant's position 
regarding the n o t a r y ' s failure to set forth tholi place of 
residence an ' • ie uaie i f hi i romm issi on i?j<piM-u! \ /oie 
presented i^wer re ii• , ppellant's Motion to Reconsider. 
The issue was * ^ briefed .^. the Memorandum Supporting the 
. 3 . 
Motion to Reconsider and supporting affidavits were submitted to 
the district court. 
As the Motion to Reconsider and the Memorandum Supporting the 
Motion were filed in the district court prior to the time the 
court denied Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, it must be assumed 
that the lower court made its decision after reviewing the file. 
Thus, the lower court had an opportunity to review the arguments 
regarding the issue now on appeal regarding the failure of the 
jurat to set forth the expiration date of the notary commission 
and residence. 
In addition, as the Motion to Reconsider and the Memorandum 
Supporting the Motion, as well as the affidavits were filed with 
the district court, said documents are a part of the record on 
appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a) states that 
the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court 
constitute the record on appeal. The Committee Note to Rule 11 
states that "the record on appeal incudes all of the original 
papers filed in the district court . . . and the supreme court can 
rely on any material contained in the district court's original 
file." It is obvious from this Note that Appellant's arguments 
with respect to the issue regarding the failure of the jurat to 
set forth the commission expiration date and residence were 
properly presented to the trial court in the original papers filed 
in the trial court by Appellant and are considered a part of the 
record on appeal and as such may be reviewed by this 
Court. 
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Respondents cited Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1983) as supporting their position that the issue regarding the 
jurat may not be heard by this Court. However, this case can be 
easily distinguished from the instant matter. In Utah County, 
the appellants neither complained to the trial court as to the 
sum deposited in the court nor raised as an issue the 
noncompliance of the County until the matter came to trial three 
and one-half years later. Utah's Supreme Court thus ruled that 
the appellants had waived their right to raise the issue at the 
appellate level by failing to raise the issue at any time to the 
lower court. Utah County at 85. 
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the issue had been 
considered by the trial court in rendering its decision with 
respect to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, the 
arguments raised by Appellant in its brief were presented to the 
trial court in a timely manner in its Motion to Reconsider. 
Obviously, Appellant has not waived its right to raise this issue 
as the issue was brought in a timely manner before the trial 
court. 
With respect to the affidavits submitted along with the 
Motion to Reconsider, Appellant merely submits that the 
affidavits are a part of the record on appeal and that according 
to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may be relied on by 
this Court in rendering a decision regarding this issue. 
Respondents1 reliance on Bradford v. Simpson, 541 P.2d 612 
(Idaho, 1975) is misplaced as this case is not dispositive of the 
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case at bar. The court in Bradford stated that affidavits 
executed in support of a motion for new trial cannot be used to 
establish facts which should have been but were not made part of 
the record in the district court. However, in the instant case, 
Appellant submitted affidavits to support the Motion to 
Reconsider, not a Motion for a New Trial. Further, the 
affidavits were submitted by different counsel than the counsel 
present at the Motion for Summary Judgment. The affidavits 
executed in support of the Motion to Reconsider were facts which 
could not have been made a part of the record earlier. Thus, the 
Bradford case is not dispositive of the matter. 
In conclusion, the issue regarding the failure of the jurat 
to give their notary commission expiration date and place of 
residence may be heard by this Court. The issue was before the 
trial court and was considered by the court when ruling on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement. The arguments 
supporting Appellant's position regarding this issue were 
presented to the trial court in its Motion to Reconsider. As 
such, the issue was properly raised at the trial court level 
before seeking appellate review. Further, all original papers 
filed in the district court compose the record on appeal and may 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the affidavits 
submitted to the trial court are a part of the record on appeal 
and may be relied upon by the Supreme Court in rendering a 
decision. 
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II. VALLEY BANK WAS PROPERLY JOINED AS A PARTY TO THE 
FORECLOSURE ACTION PRIOR TO THE FINAL HEARING OF THE CASE 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§38-1-11 AND 38-1-13 
(1953). 
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-11 (1953) contains the general 
time limitation for the commencement of the foreclosure action. 
Respondents, at p. 28 of their brief, Contend that the two 
requirements contained in Section 38-1-11 must be read in the 
conjunctive. The two requirements stated in Section 38-1-11 
should be read in the disjunctive since they do not address the 
same issues. The first requirement deals with the commencement 
of the foreclosure action and the second deals with the 
preservation of the right to proceed against those not initially 
joined to the action and those who acquire an interest in the 
property after the commencement of the action. 
The first requirement stated in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-11 
(1953) is that the action be commenced "within twelve months 
after completion of the original contract, or the suspension of 
work thereunder for a period of thirty days." The second 
requirement of Section 38-1-11 is that once a foreclosure action 
is commenced, or as it is being commenced, a lis pendens should 
be filed within the same twelve month period to place those not 
made parties to the action and those without actual knowledge of 
the action on constructive notice of the pendency of the action. 
Thus a mechanic's lien claimant preserves his right to proceed 
against those parties claiming an interest in the property but 
not yet joined as parties to the action and against those 
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acquiring an interest in the property after the commencement of 
the action. 
The Respondents, at p. 29 of their brief, also contend that 
the joinder and intervention rules of Section 38-1-13 apply only 
to mechanic's lien claimants. However, there are no specific 
references to "mechanic's liens" or to "liens created under this 
chapter" as would be expected if there was meant to be a 
limitation on the application of the Section to mechanic's lien 
claimants. Contrary to Respondents' interpretation of the term 
"lien" in Section 38-1-13, the term should be read in its generic 
sense to include any encumbrance on the title of the property. 
Clearly Section 38-1-13 was intended to be a general joinder and 
intervention rule in mechanic's lien cases. 
Respondents rely upon AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree 
Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) to 
support the decision by the trial court that all parties to a 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action must be joined within twelve 
months or the mechanic's lien claim is jurisdictionally barred. 
However, Respondents have failed to identify the critical aspects 
of that case, the mechanic's lien statute, and the case at bar. 
In AAA Fencing, the facts were significantly different than 
in the case presently before this Court and, therefore, easily 
distinguishable. In AAA Fencing, the mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action was not commenced until fourteen months following the last 
work on the project. There was no foreclosure action for a non-
party to have actual knowledge of and there was no lis pendens to 
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impute constructive knowledge to a non-party. Both facts are 
present in the case at bar. Appellant's foreclosure action was 
unquestionably commenced within the requisite time period and 
Appellant's lis pendens was timely filed. Furthermore, 
Respondents have admitted actual knowledge of the foreclosure 
action. 
Respondents' position that a person claiming an interest in 
the property cannot be joined to a mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action after the twelve month time period simply does not make 
sense under the Utah mechanic's lien statutes. An action to 
foreclosure a mechanic's lien is an action against the property 
and the title to the property rather than an action against 
individuals. Under the Utah mechanic's lien statutes, the only 
requirements are that the mechanic's lien foreclosure action be 
commenced within twelve months from the last date labor and/or 
materials were provided to the project. The fact that all 
parties are not joined to the timely filed action is not relevant 
until the time for the final hearing as stated in Utah Code 
Annotated §38-1-13 (1953). To accept Respondents' position on 
this issue would be to nullify the joinder and intervention rules 
stated in Section 38-1-13. 
Furthermore, Respondents' position that a person claiming an 
interest in the property cannot be joined to a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action after the twelve month time period is not 
realistic in the current legal system and under the Utah 
mechanic's lien statutes. Under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 
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(1953 as amended), the successful party is entitled to be awarded 
its costs and attorneys' fees. Most often in a foreclosure 
action it is unclear whether there is a basis for a claim of 
priority over lending institutions until well into the discovery 
stage of the litigation which is very frequently after the twelve 
month time period has lapsed. To require a plaintiff to name a 
lending institution as a party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action until a claim of priority is borne out by the facts of the 
case, would be unduly exposing such plaintiff to liability for 
such lending institution's attorneys' fees and costs. The only 
equitable, as well as reasonable statutory, reading of Sections 
38-1-11 and 38-1-13 is to allow the joinder of persons claiming 
an interest in the property, and who have actual knowledge of the 
foreclosure action or are deemed to have constructive knowledge 
of the foreclosure action under a properly filed lis pendens, 
until the final hearing on the case as stated in Section 38-1-13. 
Once the final hearing on the case is commenced, the action is 
void as to non-parties since they can no longer be joined to the 
action. 
In the case at bar, Appellant timely filed the foreclosure 
action and timely filed its lis pendens. Valley Bank had actual 
knowledge of the prior and continuing construction work on the 
project prior to making loans on the property. Valley Bank had 
actual knowledge of the foreclosure action by Appellant against 
the property for which Valley Bank had made loans. Appellant 
joined Valley Bank as a party to the prior commencement of the 
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final hearing on the foreclosure action. Therefore, Appellant 
properly joined Valley Bank and the foreclosure action is not 
jurisdictionally barred as against Valley Bank. 
III. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS ACTION. 
Several creative arguments are made in the Respondents' 
brief relating to the award of attorneys' fees. Nevertheless, as 
Respondents failed to raise this issue at the trial court level, 
they are precluded from raising the issue now. Issues not timely 
raised at the trial court level may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah, 
1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the summary judgments entered against it 
in favor of Respondent Copper State, Respondent Valley Bank and 
Respondent Cottonwood Thrift and that this Court remand the case 
for trial on the merits. Furthermore, Appellant respectfully 
requests that Respondents' request for attorneys' fees be denied. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 1987. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: ^ Qn , vr,\l ^ , ^ W W < » k 
Robelrt F. Bibcock 
Darrel J. Bastwick 
Attorneys For Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Projects Unlimited 
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